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Valuing Fractional Interests
In Art for Estate Tax Purposes
By Wendy C. Gerzog
Wendy C. Gerzog is a
professor at the University
of Baltimore School of Law.
It is difficult to value fractional interests in art because there is virtually no
market in those interests.
Nevertheless, the Tax Court
in Estate of Elkins valued the
decedent’s fractional interWendy C. Gerzog
ests in multiple artworks
that the decedent and his children highly cherished.
The court first addressed the restricted agreements
under section 2703 and then determined the value
of the decedent’s interests in the art.
Copyright 2013 Wendy C. Gerzog.
All rights reserved.

In Estate of Elkins,1 the decedent owned a 50
percent community property interest in 64 works of
contemporary art, ranging from the very valuable
to the more ordinary. The collection was principally
housed and exhibited in his homes and office. In
1990 he and his wife transferred their community
interests in three of those pieces respectively to
separate 10-year grantor retained income trusts
(GRITs), which allowed them to retain the use of the
collection for the term of the trust and to then
distribute their interests equally to each of their
three children. The decedent’s wife, however, died
within the 10-year term and, under the GRIT provisions, her interest in the trust passed to the
decedent. Likewise, in her will she left him her
community interest in the remaining artwork,
which, however, the decedent partially disclaimed.
The disclaimer left him holding a 23.055 percent
interest in addition to his own 50 percent community interest in the 61 artworks, and it left the
children each owning an 8.98167 percent interest in
the disclaimed portion.

1

Estate of Elkins v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. No. 5 (2013).
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On February 14, 2000, soon after the disclaimer,
the decedent and his children contracted regarding
the disclaimed interest, outlining their respective
rights and responsibilities concerning the possession and control of the 61 artworks. Article 7 of the
agreement provided that any sale would require
unanimous consent of the parties, ‘‘their respective
heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns.’’ The cotenants’ agreement stated Texas law
would apply.
Effective July 13, 2000, at the end of the decedent’s GRIT term, the decedent and his children
executed a lease regarding the use of two of the
three artworks in the GRITs. The decedent’s children allowed him to retain possession of the art on
a yearly, renewable basis, in return for his payment
of rent to them. The rental amount was left blank
and was unpaid until approximately six years later
when fair rental value was determined. On February 17, 2006, the cotenants’ agreement between the
decedent and his children was amended to include
the remaining piece of GRIT artwork not subject to
this lease.
The decedent died on February 21, 2006, and his
will provided for his undivided fractional interests
in the artwork to pass to his descendants.2 On his
estate tax return, his 73.055 percent interest in the 61
artworks was valued at $9,497,650, and his 50
percent interest in the GRIT art was valued at
$2,652,000. Those computations included a 44.75
percent combined discount for lack of control and
marketability. The parties agreed that undiscounted, the estate tax values for those interests
were, respectively, $24,580,650 and $10,600,000, for
a total of $35,180,650.
The IRS’s notice of estate tax deficiency determined that the decedent’s art interests should be
included in his estate at their undiscounted values.
Its conclusion was based on two theories: (1) section
2703(a)(1) required that the restrictions in both the
cotenants’ agreement and in the lease be ignored for

2
The decedent’s residuary estate passed to his son and to a
family foundation, for which the estate was entitled to a
charitable deduction. However, because the residuary bore the
burden of the taxes, that fact required reducing the charitable
share and thereby the charitable deduction if the court determined an estate tax deficiency.
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3
Also, the notice reduced the charitable deduction. See supra
note 2 for a discussion of that issue.
4
The court said:
Mr. Nash summarizes the ‘‘key factors’’ making decedent’s fractional interests in the art ‘‘unappealing’’ to
potential buyers as follows: (1) the inability to sell the art
at auction houses, (2) the lack of exclusive possession and
the inability to force a sale of the art without litigation
against the Elkins children as coowners, (3) possible
litigation involving time of possession and proper care,
storage or transportation of the art, and (4) the difficulty
or impossibility of insuring the purchased interest or
using it as collateral for a loan. Nonetheless, he concludes
that speculators ‘‘would be willing to purchase * * *
[decedent’s] interests if appropriately discounted.’’
Estate of Elkins, slip op. at 16.
5
Id. at 18.
6
Category I art was valued at $4,336,859; Category II at
$976,451; and Category III at $149,366.
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the less expensive art. Finally, Miller approximated
the litigation expenses to range from $25,000 to
more than $1.1 million for the most valuable piece.
Mitchell said the cotenants’ agreement and
fractional interests validated the application of
large discounts. He explained the need for discounts in terms of ‘‘the reduction of both the
buyer’s psychic and financial returns attributable to
fractional ownership’’7:
Mr. Mitchell assumes, on the basis of the Nash
and Miller reports, that the other interest
holders have no desire to sell the art so that,
under option 1[8], the hypothetical buyer
‘‘faces the prospect of holding a nonmarketable interest * * * [indefinitely], with no
prospects for * * * [monetizing his interest] and
no ability to control decisions regarding the
underlying * * * Art,’’ and, under option 2, he
is, in effect, purchasing a ‘‘litigation claim.’’9
Thus, under option 1, applying Nash’s three
categories for the decedent’s art, Mitchell concluded
discounts ranging from 51.7 to 71.7 percent for
Category I art, a 71.1 percent discount for the 19
works in Category II, and a 79.7 percent discount
for the remaining Category III items. For option 2,
Mitchell computed discounts of between 60 and 85
percent for Category I and five Category II works,
90 percent or more for the remaining Category II
items, and 100 percent for Category III items (because litigation costs would exceed the purchase
price for assets in that category). Mitchell’s appraisal of the collection totaled $7,658,645.
The government’s experts included Karen
Hanus-McManus, a modern and contemporary art
appraiser who had performed ‘‘a study on secondary markets for fractional interests in art,’’10 and
John R. Cahill, an attorney whose practice included
mostly art-related litigation and planning issues.
Hanus-McManus testified that no established market exists for segmented interests in art. Although
there had been sales of those interests by co-owners
who had wanted to sell or donate the whole art
itself, that data did not reflect the facts here. Cahill
concluded that the cotenants’ agreement and the

7

Estate of Elkins, slip op. at 25.
Option 1 referred to owners of a fractional interest in art
who want to convert their interest into money by selling their
interest. Thus, option 1 related to the non-marketability factor.
Option 2 referred to those who seek the sale of the artwork itself,
through a partition action, with the sale proceeds divided
proportionately among the owners. Thus, option 2 used Miller’s
report on litigation costs.
9
Estate of Elkins, slip op. at 26.
10
Id. at 31.
8
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valuation purposes; and (2) the decedent’s fractional interest discounts were inflated and inappropriate.3
At trial, the taxpayers called three expert witnesses: David Nash, an experienced appraiser and
art dealer; William T. Miller, a Texas attorney experienced in partition actions and art liquidations;
and Mark L. Mitchell, a director of an appraisal firm
who had experience in valuing undivided interests
in personal property but not undivided interests in
art.
Nash met with the decedent’s children and examined all the artwork. His evaluation was strongly
influenced by the fact that the children were adamant about keeping the pieces until the last family
owner died. He concluded that all potential buyers
would demand heavy discounts because of the
unlikelihood of acquiring the remaining fractional
interests and because of the potential for litigation
with the decedent’s children over various matters
such as possession. Museums would be uninterested in buying co-owned art that was not coowned with another museum or entity.4 For the five
‘‘highly desirable’’ pieces, he assigned a 50 to 80
percent discount; for the 19 ‘‘good’’ artworks, an 80
to 90 percent discount; and for the remaining 40
holdings, a 95 percent discount, asserting that this
last group would ‘‘have only a nominal value.’’5
Applying those discounts, Nash valued the aggregate collection at $5,462,366.6
Miller said that while paragraph 7 of the cotenants’ agreement was effectively a waiver of the
children’s right to partition, he believed that a Texas
court would likely invalidate the next paragraph’s
statement extending that limitation to others. Miller
also said a sale was more likely than a partition in
kind, and he estimated that the litigation would on
average take seven years for the more costly artwork (nine of the pieces) and three to four years for

COMMENTARY / ESTATE AND GIFT RAP

Consistent with the court’s finding about the
applicability of section 2703(a)(2), the court held
that the restrictions in both the cotenants’ agreement and in the lease did not apply to the seller’s
right to sell the decedent’s artworks. The court next
addressed whether the estate tax fair market value
regulation allowed any discount from the decedent’s pro rata share. The government argued that
no discount was permissible because, based on
Scull13 and Stone,14 the FMV was the decedent’s pro
rata share of the full value of the artwork. The court,
however, rejected the applicability of those cases
because they each allowed discounts based on
‘‘various uncertainties that would confront a hypothetical buyer of art.’’15
The court proceeded to emphasize that the facts
underlined the children’s ‘‘strong sentimental and
emotional ties to each of the 64 works of art’’ and
that a hypothetical buyer would be dealing with
owners who were unlikely to sell either an interest
in the art or any complete artwork. Moreover, Nash
based his values primarily on that fact. Therefore,
the court found that some discount was appropriate
to reflect the uncertainty of the buyer’s ability to
monetize his investment.
The court rejected the government’s argument
that applying the particular characteristics of the
children undermines the requirement that the seller
be a hypothetical seller and not the actual seller
because the children were co-owners and not the
seller of the decedent’s fractional interests. The
court said the children’s antipathy to any sale was a
relevant fact for valuation purposes. The court
likewise rejected the government’s reliance on Holman,16 which requires that the hypothetical buyer
and seller be rational economic beings who lack the
emotional and unique qualities of actual human
beings. The court said the children would view
their position to be ‘‘in their best psychic interests;
that is, they would be willing to forgo the financial
gain from a sale of the art in order to keep the
collection intact and continue to enjoy it.’’17
The experts agreed that there was no market in
fractional interests in art. According to the court,
however, that conclusion did not mean that it had to
apply the full value of the artwork without any
discount to reflect the applicable relevant facts, as
the government contended.18 Thus, the court held
that there was no prohibition to allowing a discount

13

Estate of Scull v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-211.
Stone v. United States, No. 3:06-cv-00259 (N.D. Cal. 2007),
aff’d, No. 07-17068 (9th Cir. 2009).
15
Estate of Elkins, slip op. at 55.
16
Holman v. Commissioner, 601 F.3d 763, 775 (8th Cir. 2010).
17
Estate of Elkins, slip op. at 60.
18
The court also rejected the government’s other arguments.
14

11

Id. at 34.
The government cited to section 170, the income tax
charitable deduction, as support of this contention.
12
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lease were ‘‘not comparable to similar arrangements entered into by persons in arm’s-length art
market transactions.’’11
The court first addressed the section 2703 issue:
whether the transferability limitations in the cotenants’ agreement and the lease were restrictions
covered by section 2703(a)(2). The government argued that the proper market to value the decedent’s
art interests was the retail market of the artwork
itself wherein, as a co-owner, he would have received his proportional part of the proceeds. It also
maintained that the purpose of executing those
documents was to discount valuation for estate tax
purposes. To prevent that result, the government
argued, section 2703(a)(2) required the court to
disregard the restrictions in those documents when
assessing the value of decedent’s interests in the
artwork. According to the government, the children’s refusal to sell the artwork was immaterial
under the regulations; there was no market for the
sale of fractional interests in art; and what commonly occurs with co-owners is a sale and then
division of the receipts. The government also asserted that the taxpayers’ discounts were unsupported by their experts’ testimony and that
allowing discounts would contravene the government’s long-held stance that fractional interests in
art are not discounted for charitable deduction
purposes.12
The taxpayers contended that the cotenants’
agreement restricted only the sale of the artwork
and not the sale of a fractional interest. They
conceded, however, that section 2703(a)(2) applied
to the lease of the two GRIT artworks. The taxpayers asserted that case law, particularly in the
Fifth Circuit, requires discounts for partial interests
in personal property, which encompassed the artwork in decedent’s estate, and that the discounts
should also reflect the litigation costs associated
with a partition action. Finally, they maintained that
the artwork must be valued individually and not as
a collection because the artwork was not an interconnected unit.
The court held for the government on the section
2703(a)(2) question. Although intent evidence was
inconclusive, the court held that intent was not even
relevant to the application of that code section.
Moreover, although the court did not consider this
issue determinative of the valuation of the decedent’s art, it held that it would disregard any
restrictions imposed on the decedent’s right to
partition in the cotenants’ agreement.
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Estate of Elkins, slip op. at 69.
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to the decedent’s children and that that fact was
relevant under the FMV regulation. In the small art
world, a hypothetical buyer and seller would be
aware of the children’s strong feelings, and that
would affect their negotiations. Moreover, the court
rejected Nash’s conclusion that a museum would
not be willing to co-own artwork with an individual
owner. Thus, the court rejected, as producing an
unrealistically low value, the taxpayers’ expert
opinions that relied on the ‘‘dubious assumption
that the Elkins children would mount an unrelenting defense of the status quo, ignoring the very high
probability that, instead, the children would seek to
purchase the hypothetical buyer’s interests in the
art.’’20
The court, therefore, valued the decedent’s interests in the artwork at their pro rata market value but
allowed a 10 percent discount to reflect a small
amount of uncertainty regarding the children’s intentions.
Analysis and Conclusion
Sometimes the truth is revealed by standing back
and viewing the facts from another perspective. In
the somewhat unusual situation in which coowners sorely want to retain artwork and would be
hard-pressed to sell any of the pieces, a fractional
interest is worth more than any of the taxpayers’
experts had supposed.

20

Id. at 78.
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from the decedent’s pro rata FMV in determining
the value of his interest for estate tax purposes.
Addressing the question of an appropriate discount, the court said the taxpayers’ experts failed to
consider the children’s ownership position in relation to a hypothetical buyer of the decedent’s
fractional interests. That is, those experts did not
assess the fact that a ‘‘hypothetical buyer would be
in an excellent position to persuade the Elkins
children, who, together, had the financial wherewithal to do so, to buy the buyer’s interest in any or
all of the works, thereby enabling them to continue
to maintain absolute ownership and possession of
the art.’’19
Thus, it was likely that because of the children’s
desire to retain the art for themselves, they would
be inspired to pay the buyer an amount close to the
decedent’s pro rata share and thereby avoid litigation costs and achieve their aim of full family
ownership of the art. Indeed, the court concluded
that the children would pay more than a disinterested buyer to accomplish that result, a result that
makes much more sense in this context than the
assertion that the children’s ‘‘staying power’’ would
lead them to undergo years of litigation when this
simple alternative would more logically appeal as a
solution to the children.
The court concluded that the hypothetical buyer
would be in an excellent position to sell his interests

